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Globalization, the world system, and “democracy promotion” in U.S. foreign policy

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In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works. Very often therefore truthful analyses are bound to have a critical ring, to seem like exposures rather than objective statements. ... For all students of human society sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology. A scholar who tries to be objective needs these feelings as part of his working equipment.

Barrington Moore

It has become commonplace among scholars to recognize that a rethinking of paradigmatic scope is required in light of the macrosocial dynamic of our epoch: globalization. Research and debate on globalization can be expected to intensify for some time to come before we reach any paradigmatic breakthrough in our understanding of emergent global society or consensus on the contours of a twenty-first century world order. The purpose of this article, certainly more modest than advancing any new globalization paradigm, is to analyze and theorize – from a globalization perspective – on an essential yet little understood change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World in recent years. This change has been described by both scholars and policy-makers as a shift towards “democracy promotion.”

The reorientation of U.S. foreign policy, from support for authoritarian regimes to the promotion of “democratic” political systems in the Third World, has major implications for international relations and restructuring of the global order, and particularly, for North-South relations in the “new world order.” As such, it merits serious analytical and theoretical attention by scholars. There is a huge (and still growing) body of literature on democratization in the Third World, but the focus here is

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on endogenous political processes, not U.S. interaction with those processes. Most of the literature that does exist on the U.S. policy of “democracy promotion” has come from the policymaking community, and is eminently policy-oriented.¹ A handful of academic volumes has reviewed dimensions of “democracy promotion” with little *theorization* on the nature of the shift in policy or the actual policy practice.² Most explanations attribute this new policy to the evolution of normative or of practical-conjunctural considerations among state managers: policy-makers have gone through a “learning process” in selecting the most appropriate policies; with the collapse of the old Soviet-bloc, the United States can now afford to implement its policies with “softer tools”; the “ideal” of liberal capitalism has triumphed, and so on.

While these behaviorist arguments merit attention, the context in which they are advanced needs to be deepened by linking, through theoretical discourse, practical-conjunctural considerations on the part of state managers to broader historical processes, social structure, and political economy that inform foreign policy. I attempt in this article to explain “democracy promotion” on the basis of just such a linkage. My argument may be summarized as follows: at the level of theoretical generalization, this shift may be conceived, in the Gramscian sense, as indicating new forms of transnational control accompanying the rise of global capitalism. Specifically, behind this shift is an effort to replace coercive means of social control with consensual ones in the South within a highly stratified international system, in which the United States plays a leadership role on behalf of an emergent *transnational* hegemonic configuration. At the practical level, this shift involves the development of new organs of the U.S. state and new modalities of engagement abroad that may be perceived as what sociologist Leslie Sklair terms a “transnational political practice.”³

It is my view that international relations, and foreign policy as a subset therein, should be a multidisciplinary concern in which sociology has much to offer in the way of correctives and theoretical development, especially in light of globalization processes. Political sociology, with its insights into the nature of the state and social structure, elites and masses, relations between structure and agency, and the interconnections it draws between the different dimensions of the social totality, provides great analytical and explanatory potential, as international relations scholar Fred Halliday pointed out in a recent article.⁴ Comparative and historical sociology, with its stress on the world-historic context of international developments, and the sociology of develop-

ment, with its clues to patterns of change over time and place, help us understand transitions between distinct historic epochs. And sociology's world-system theory, in particular its theoretical presupposition that the development of international society is constituted by the spread of a social system at the international level, constitutes a powerful macro-structural framework for analyzing world events, including "democracy promotion." On the other hand, political science has made a crucial contribution to our understanding of social forces and globalizing dynamics with the recent development of a Gramscian model of international relations.

I intend, therefore, to draw on an unorthodox version of world-system theory and a Gramscian model of international relations, as well as on certain established insights of political, comparative-historical, and development sociology, in my attempt to theorize on "democracy promotion" in U.S. foreign policy. This article is divided into three parts. In the first, I analyze the shift in U.S. foreign policy to "democracy promotion" and discuss democracy as an essentially contested concept. I also situate the U.S. policy shift within a world-system perspective and a Gramscian model of international relations and of transnational processes in the age of the global economy. I summarize the concrete mechanisms, in particular, "political aid" programs, through which this shift has taken place. In the second, I summarize "democracy promotion" undertakings in several countries (the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua, and Haiti) on the basis of a mounting body of empirical works on U.S. involvement in Third World transitions. The purpose here is to provide theoretical propositions with some empirical points of reference. In the third, I draw some tentative conclusions and suggest directions for future study.

I should note, as a caveat, that space constraints preclude a full exploration here of the theoretical and analytical issues at hand. But the risk of oversimplification, especially when novel theoretical and macro-sociological propositions are involved, should not mean, as Max Horkheimer once cautioned, that we impose a "taboo against all thinking" by limiting ourselves to what has been "properly qualified" and "completely corroborated."⁵

From promoting dictatorship to promoting “democracy”

There are three general assumptions on which I proceed. First, political systems in the periphery have, seen from the long-historic lens of the modern era, been penetrated and influenced, if not entirely imposed, by the core. Changes in general core-periphery relations have consequences for peripheral political systems. Modern colonialism created political systems outright or transformed existing ones, which then gained newfound autonomy following decolonization. The relationship between changes in general core-periphery relations and changes in peripheral political systems should be viewed as a legitimate unit of social-scientific inquiry. The global economy is fundamentally redefining North-South general relations, economic as well as political.

Second, globalization is a new phase of capitalism that involves a transition to a *qualitatively* new stage in the world system. My application of the world-system framework differs from the more orthodox approach advanced by Wallerstein and others,⁶ in historic periodization, in the Weberian definition of capitalism as a market rather than a production relation, and in the view of the state and its relation to nations and social groups. The assumption here, regarding periodization and production relations, is that the modern world system was characterized in an earlier period by a dominant capitalist mode, headquartered in the core, which articulated itself with distinct semi- or pre-capitalist modes in peripheral regions. Under globalization, capitalist production relations are displacing rather than merely becoming articulated with, all residual pre-capitalist relations. Regarding the state, the assumption is that globalization is separating the state, conceived as a theoretical abstraction, from the nation-state as a concrete sovereign territorial unit.

Third, the United States is the last dominant core nation state and the one under whose aegis globalization is unfolding. A key disjuncture in the globalization process is the internationalization of productive forces within an institutional system still centered around the nation state. This contradiction helps explain why outdated nation-state-centered approaches persist among scholars whose objects of inquiry are transnational phenomena. The increasing separation of classes from territoriality and class power from state power has been explored in a number of recent studies, and is expressed, among other ways, in a rise in the structural power of transnational capital and in the institutional power of supranational organizations, concomitant to a decline in the

direct power of states.⁷ This process involves a dispersal of global decision-making away from specific core states, even though transnational groups continue to filter policies through existing state apparatuses. In elaborating a policy of “democracy promotion,” the United States is not acting on behalf of a “U.S.” elite, but playing a leadership role on behalf of an emergent transnational elite.

Prior to globalization, leadership in the world system shifted from one core power to another over time, a process involving periodic swings between conflict and consensus among core powers and a fairly constant relation of domination by the center over the periphery. Upon assuming leadership among core powers following WWII, the United States filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the old colonial empires through numerous forms of military and political intervention in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.⁸ In this way, the United States came to play a pivotal role in the development of political systems in the periphery in the post-WWII years. As the historical record shows, the principal political form that the United States promoted was authoritarian regimes. U.S. interventionism resulted, whether intentional or as an incidental byproduct, in authoritarian political and social arrangements in the Third World as a strategic girder to the maintenance of international order and stability. The United States promoted and supported a global political network of civilian-military regimes and outright dictatorships in Latin America, white minority and one-party dictatorships of post-colonial elites in Africa, and repressive states in Asia. The United States thus exercised its domination in the periphery in this period chiefly through coercive domination. Challenges to the post-WWII global order and its pattern of international – particularly, North/South – asymmetry, took various forms, such as organized national liberation movements, (e.g., Vietnam, Cuba, Chile), multi-class coalitions for democratization and social justice (e.g., Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Greece), and efforts by nationalist-oriented elites to secure greater autonomy and local control (e.g., Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt). These challenges were met by U.S. intervention to suppress popular social change and to bolster authoritarian political systems. These systems were judged to be the most expedient means of achieving stability and social control in the periphery required for the free operation of international capital. In this way, the U.S. state functioned as what sociologists James Petras and Morris Morley refer to as the “imperial state,” promoting and protecting the expansion of capital across state boundaries by the multinational corporate community.⁹

Much post-WWII literature on U.S. foreign policy has erroneously interpreted this interventionism, and behind it, the “elective affinity” between authoritarianism in the periphery and U.S.-core domination, as driven by Cold War considerations. Although perceived competition from the former Soviet Union was important, it was not the driving force behind intervention, and often amounted to little more than a rationalization for U.S. policy. As political scientist Samuel Huntington has noted, “You may have to sell [intervention in the Third World] in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union you are fighting. That is what the United States has done ever since the Truman Doctrine.”¹⁰ The lack of democracy in the former Soviet bloc (and its own support for authoritarian arrangements in the periphery) was one major factor, apart from structural limitations, contributing to the historic failure of anti-systemic projects in the twentieth century, but this tells us little about what drove U.S. policy and what accounts for the dramatic change to “democracy promotion” in the early 1980s.¹¹ A related Cold War explanation of U.S. support for authoritarianism, as a response on the part of policymakers to Soviet influence in the Third World, not only conflates East-West geopolitical dynamics with more fundamental center-periphery dynamics, but also fails to hold up to longitudinal or logical scrutiny. Coercive domination over the periphery by the United States and other core powers dates back to the formative years of the world system, and was also the norm in U.S. foreign policy during eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century periods of territorial and extra-territorial U.S. expansion, and therefore predates the creation of the Soviet Union. If support for authoritarianism was a response to a perceived Soviet threat, rather than a dynamic internal to center-peripheral relations, whereas “promoting democracy” may be explained by the absence of a “communist threat,” then consensual modes of social control could have been expected to mediate core-periphery, and U.S.-Third World, relations in the absence (prior to the existence) of the Soviet Union. The Cold War, therefore, does not provide causal explanation for U.S. support for a given political (sub)system or mode of social control in the periphery.

The driving force behind post-WWII intervention throughout the Third World was expansion and defense of a budding post-colonial international capitalism under U.S. leadership. U.S. policymakers were quite clear on the matter. Much U.S. strategic planning for this period emphasized securing U.S. and core access to the raw materials, markets, and labor power of the Third World, and on assuring a political environment propitious to the operation of U.S., and increasingly inter-

national, capital.¹² National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum NSC-68, one of the key foreign-policy documents of the post-World War II era, stated, for instance, that post-WWII policy embraced “two subsidiary policies.” One was to foster “a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish,” and the other was “containment of the Soviet Union,” which “seeks to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system.” The Memorandum went on: “Even if there was no Soviet Union we would face the great problem” of achieving “order and security” for U.S. global interests. It concluded by calling for “a rapid buildup of [U.S.] political, economic, and military strength” around the world.¹³ And the whole focus of President Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy was not a “communist threat” but control over the world’s resources, and in particular, securing unrestricted U.S. access to the Third World. *Behind East-West relations, therefore, North-South relations were always intrinsic and central to the whole Cold War era.*

Foreign-policy analyses that focus on behavioral explanations often track and analyze policies as sets of pronouncements at the level of public discourse of successive administrations, thereby confusing what foreign policymakers *say* they do with what they *actually* do, and conflating policy discourse with the actual content of policy. “Democracy,” and not authoritarianism, has always been a central focus of U.S. foreign policy as articulated by state managers. As the first bourgeois republic, the legitimizing discourse of democracy was central to the founding of the United States and the theme has therefore always been an integral component of foreign policy. The democratic discourse that legitimized the republic since its inception also required a “democratic” legitimization of foreign policy, which explains, in part, the disjuncture between policy discourse and the actual U.S. practice of promoting authoritarianism.¹⁴ The historic record underscores the antinomy. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. state imposed authoritarian, and even totalitarian, arrangements on the peoples it conquered and colonized in peripheral zones under its influence, including many of the Native American and Mexican peoples it colonized in what is now the mainland United States, and in the Greater Caribbean Basin and in the Pacific areas of direct U.S. colonial and semi-colonial influence, where coercive means of social control remained firmly entrenched (the U.S. state, moreover, backed European colonial coercive control even as it competed with European rivals over spheres of influence). The ideological imperative of emphasizing “democracy” in foreign policy heightened after WWII, as a result

of the worldwide upsurge of democratic aspirations in the wake of the defeat of fascism, the breakup of the old colonial system, and the position of world leadership assumed by the United States. The theme of “democracy” was thus emphasized again in the 1950s as a central tenet of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, as well as in the 1960s by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. But a general reading of U.S. policies in the 1950s and 1960s reveals the underlying reliance on (or accommodation with) authoritarian arrangements remained by and large entrenched.¹³ Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, expressed the U.S. reasoning during this period: “These [authoritarian regimes] are not the people we want to support . . . [but] we know that we cannot make a transition [to democracy] without losing control of the whole situation.”¹⁶ After an even more brazen embrace of authoritarianism during the Nixon-Ford years, the theme of “democracy” was reintroduced as part of the Carter “human rights policy.” But the Carter administration’s actual policy continued to support largely existing authoritarian arrangements, even though it did pave the way for the decisive moment of change in U.S. policy in the 1980s.

Three interwoven factors converged in the 1970s and 1980s to bring about a decisive change in the “elective affinity” between authoritarianism and U.S. domination in the periphery. First, popular movements in the Third World were spreading against repressive political systems and exploitative socioeconomic orders established during the Cold War years. As the “elective affinity” between authoritarianism and U.S. domination began to unravel, support for authoritarianism became an increasingly ineffective means of assuring stability and confronting mass demands for popular social change. A crisis of elite rule thus began to coalesce at the world systemic level.¹⁷ Second, and closely-related, a long-running debate within the extended policymaking community was resolved decisively in the early 1980s in favor of substituting support for authoritarianism with “democracy promotion.” Third, the emergence of the global economy began to redefine the basis for international relations and class formation, to create new sets of actors that became transnational in character, and to generate new pressures for political change within the South. In short, by redefining the economic terms of North-South relations, globalization also redefined the political terms of these relations. These three factors are tightly interwoven and do not lend themselves to analytical separation as autonomous variables. Taken together, they culminated in the mid-1980s (importantly), *before* the Cold War thaw and subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc) in an explicit shift in U.S. policy from the promotion of

authoritarianism to the active promotion of “democracy.” A “democracy promotion” apparatus was created in the 1980s and early 1990s in the U.S. state, including new governmental and quasi-governmental agencies and bureaus, policy studies, and government and private conferences, to draft and implement “democracy promotion” policies and programs.¹⁸

I present a more detailed chronology of this shift in U.S. policy below. Suffice it here to observe that the emergence of “democracy promotion” in the 1980s contrasts with prior periods in U.S. foreign policy history, and with the general norm in the mediation of core-periphery relations, in which military dictatorships or authoritarian client regimes (and before them, colonial states) were sustained as the best guarantor of social control and stability. It represents the beginnings of a shift – still underway – in the method through which the core regions of the capitalist world system exercise their domination over peripheral and semi-peripheral regions, from coercive to consensual mechanisms, in the context of emergent transnational configurations. What is emerging is a new political model of North-South relations for the twenty-first century. Before elaborating on this theoretical proposition, a discussion is necessary on “democracy.”

Democracy as an essentially contested concept

Democracy is what philosopher W. B. Gallie has termed an “essentially contested concept.”¹⁹ This refers to a concept in which different and competing definitions exist, such that terms themselves are problematic since they are not reducible to “primitives.” Each definition yields different interpretations of social reality. In and of themselves, these terms are hollow and their meaning is only discernible from the vantage point of the social and theoretical context of their usage. By their nature, these terms involve implicit assumptions, are enveloped in ideology, and are therefore subsets of broader discourse that sets the framework of the political or theoretical agenda in question. Essentially contested concepts are thus sites of “discursive struggle” for control of the terms and rules of prevailing discourse.

Since democracy is a universal aspiration and the claim to promote it has mass appeal, “democracy promotion” has a crucial ideological dimension. What U.S. policymakers mean by “democracy promotion” is the promotion of *polyarchy*. Polyarchy refers to a system in which a

small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites. The pluralist assumption is that elites will respond to the general interests of majorities, through polyarchy's "twin dimensions" of "political contestation" and "political inclusiveness," as a result of the need of those who govern to win a majority of votes. The polyarchic definition of democracy was developed in U.S. academic circles closely tied to the policymaking community in the United States in the post-World War II years. According to Samuel Huntington, this "redefinition" of the classical definition of democracy as rule, or power (*cratos*) of the people (*demos*) to make it more "realistic" and "compatible" with "modern society," culminated in Robert Dahl's 1971 study, titled *Polyarchy*.²⁰ By the time the United States assumed global leadership after World War II, the polyarchic definition of democracy, which is only one variant of an essentially contested concept, had achieved hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, in social-scientific, political, and mass public discourse.

As an essentially contested concept, the polyarchic definition competes with concepts of *popular democracy*. Although, in distinction to polyarchy, there is no fully elaborated *theory* of popular democracy (a situation that strengthens the hegemonic status of the polyarchic definition), an abundance of literature is available on the subject and on the debate over democracy.²¹ The various views on popular democracy, traceable to the classical Greek definition of democracy and rooted in Rousseauian-Marxist traditions, posit a dispersal throughout society of political power through the participation of broad majorities in decision-making. This model conjoins representative government and elections to forms of participatory democracy that hold states accountable beyond the indirect mechanisms of periodic elections. Popular democracy is seen as an emancipatory project of both form and content that links the distinct spheres of the social totality, in which the construction of a democratic political order enjoys a theoretically internal relation to the construction of a democratic socioeconomic order, and democratic participation is a tool for changing unjust social and economic structures.

This is not the place to take up the debate over competing definitions of democracy. What concerns us here are the following three interwoven propositions. First, the polyarchic definition, resting on the theoretical model of pluralism and of structural-functionalist sociology, isolates explicitly the political from the social and economic spheres and situates democracy within the bounds of the former (and even at

that, it limits democratic participation to voting in elections) in contrast to the popular definition. Second, behind essentially contested concepts are *contested social orders*. Mass movements for democratization in the South are movements seeking fundamental social change, encompassing much more than reforms leading to contested elections and other institutional structures of polyarchy. Third, the contradiction between popular democracy and polyarchy is a contradiction between distinct class and group protagonists and their opposing projects for organizing society. I advance these three propositions in order to draw out the argument that the promotion of polyarchy in U.S. foreign policy is intended to suppress popular democratization, which is a threat to elite status quos and the structure of an asymmetric international order, and is thus an attempt to resolve crises of elite domination generated by globalizing pressures.

As a theoretical conceptualization distinct from polyarchy, popular democracy is concerned with both process and outcome (although a fully-elaborated theory of popular democracy would have to address such issues as the institutional structures of popular democracy and the *relation* between process and outcome). The polyarchic definition argues that democracy rests exclusively on process, so that there is no contradiction between a “democratic” process and a social order punctuated by sharp social inequalities and minority monopolization of society’s material and cultural resources. Thus, under the polyarchic definition, a system can acquire a democratic form without a democratic content or outcome. Polyarchy’s emphasis on process irrespective of outcome flows, in turn, from the theoretical premise of structural-functionalism that different spheres of the social totality are independent and linked externally to each other, and that the political sphere of the social totality, therefore, is separate from the social and economic spheres. U.S. social scientists Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset articulate this theoretical view in their introduction to a widely circulated, four-volume, study funded by the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a new agency in the foreign-policy apparatus created in 1983 to “promote democracy abroad.”²² According to the authors: “We use the term democracy in this study to signify a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system.... Indeed, a distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called economic and social democracy be separated from the question of governmental structure.”²³ (The authors also clarify that, by democracy, they are referring specifically to polyarchy.)

What theoretical or historical justification exists for the separation of the political system from socioeconomic matters is not clear. However, the implications of substituting the literal (or classic) definition of democracy with the institutional definition embodied in polyarchy are vast. By limiting the focus to political contestation among elites through procedurally free elections, such issues as who controls the material and cultural resources of society, as well as asymmetries and inequalities, both among groups within a single nation and among nations within the international order, become extraneous to the discussion of democracy. The notion that there may be a contradiction in terms between elite or class rule, in which wealth and power is monopolized by minorities, and democracy, a contradiction that would flow from the original Greek definition of power of the people, does not enter – by theoretical-definitional fiat – into the polyarchic definition.

The distinction between polyarchy and authoritarian systems should not be belittled, either theoretically or normatively. But the trappings of democratic procedure in a polyarchic political system do not mean that the lives of those in nations where the United States “promotes democracy” become filled with authentic or meaningful democratic content, much less that social justice or greater economic equality are achieved, as numerous recent transitions to polyarchy in the South have made clear. At best, the polyarchic definition leaves open the issue as to whether “political democracy” may or may not facilitate “economic democracy.” In contrast, I am arguing that polyarchy as a distinct form of elite rule performs the function of legitimating existing inequalities, but does so more effectively than authoritarianism. The intent behind promoting polyarchy is to relieve domestic pressure on the state from subordinate classes for more fundamental political, social, and economic change in emergent global society. The extremes of military regimes and highly unpopular dictatorships, although they might have represented or defended elite interests, also engendered mass-based opposition that could lead to more fundamental social, economic, and political changes that threaten perceived core and local elite interests. Mass struggles to replace authoritarian systems have sought outcomes, beyond the mere removal of dictatorships, of popular democratization. The purpose of promoting polyarchy is to remove dictatorships *and* to preempt more fundamental change. In crucial moments in these struggles, once the shift to “democracy promotion” had been effected in the early 1980s, the United States stepped in, through various forms of “democracy promotion” programs, to seek polyarchic outcomes. Polyarchy, as a form of elite rule distinct from authoritarianism and

dictatorship, may prove to be a more durable means of social control in an emergent integrated global economy and society. More precisely, polyarchic political systems may provide the foundations for a Gramscian hegemony in a transnational setting.

A Gramscian model of international relations and world order

An explanation for the shift to promoting polyarchy is best seen through analysis at two distinct levels: structural and behavioral. Structural analysis focuses on the emergence of the global economy from the 1960s and on, and the implications this has for changes in transnational politics and class formation, North-South relations, hegemony, and world order. Behavioral analysis focuses on the policy debates and strategic discussion that took place among the extended policymaking community over what types of political arrangements are most conducive to the reproduction of North-South relations and to stability and social order in the periphery of the world system. Structural analysis frames behavioral analysis: behavioral changes (i.e., policy changes) transpire within structural contexts. Although intersubjective perceptions are structurally contingent, the relation between the two is recursive, such that agency “feeds back” into and shapes structure in an interactive manner. A methodological approach that focuses on a mixture of structure and agency allows us to identify “feedback mechanisms” and tempers inclination toward functionalist teleology. Gramscian concepts, particularly of hegemony and the extended state, and the application of these concepts to international relations, help inform the link between the behavioral and the structural level of analysis and provide a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the shift from promoting authoritarianism to promoting polyarchy.

The concept of hegemony is not generally used in the social sciences, including in most world-system, Marxist, and realist models, in the Gramscian sense. The commonplace usage refers broadly to domination, rooted in the original Greek meaning of hegemony as predominance of one nation over another. The United States exercised global “hegemony” in the post-World War II era, or Great Britain was the “hegemonic” world power in the nineteenth century. The Gramscian notion of hegemony is more circumscribed, positing distinct forms, or relations, of domination, in brief: *coercive domination* and *consensual domination*. Gramscian hegemony may be viewed roughly as a relation between classes in which one class or fraction of a

class exercises leadership over other classes and strata by gaining the *active consent* of those classes and strata through ideological cooptation and political incorporation (or at least institutional neutralization rather than repressive exclusion). Hegemony as a social relation binds together a “bloc” of diverse classes and groups under circumstance of consensual domination. A social order in which hegemony has been achieved is one that takes the form of consensual (“democratic”) arrangements in the political system, and in society, characterized by a given set of juridical relations as the arbiter of social relations and procedural mechanisms for the resolution of group and class conflict. Such arrangements facilitate “the ‘spontaneous’ consent” given by other groups to “the direction imposed on social life” by the dominant groups. At the same time, hegemony mediates relations between dominant and subordinate groups, and *also* relations among dominant groups. The same consensual mechanisms for the reproduction of a given dominant constellation of social forces (“historic bloc”) involve mechanisms for consensus among dominant groups themselves.

Stated in admittedly simplified terms, dictatorship or authoritarianism may be conceived as the exercise of coercive domination and polyarchy as hegemony, or consensual domination. However, it should be stressed that hegemonic (consensual) domination does not mean the absence of coercion, much less the absence of conflict in a social formation, whether conceived as national or transnational. It is better conceived as the reproduction of social order through the salience of consensual means of social control. As Gramsci put it, hegemony is consensus protected by the “armor of coercion,” and the political superstructures of a coherent social order always combine both coercive and consensual-based elements (whether authoritarian or “democratic”). These two forms are (in Gramsci’s Hegelian language) distinct “moments” in the social relations of domination, separable only in theoretical abstraction for methodological purposes. Gramsci’s *hegemony* and Weber’s *legitimacy* are related but distinct. All social orders (and their political authority) require for their reproduction the attainment of legitimacy, which requires consent on the part of the dominated that is constructed, in the last instance, through latent or active coercion. This is of concern to the present discussion on two counts. First, authoritarian regimes display elements of consensus as much as “democratic” regimes display elements of coercion. Second, transitions to polyarchy do not involve eliminating a coercive apparatus but subordinating that apparatus to civilian elites.

A critical element in the Gramscian construct is the distinction and unity of political and civil society: *social control* takes place on two levels: in civil society and through the state, which are fused in Gramsci's *extended state* ("civil society plus political society"). The Gramscian extended state eliminates the structural-functionalist dualism of state and civil society. "The two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of hegemony which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government."²⁴ The hegemony of a ruling class or fraction is exercised in civil society as distinct from its coercive power exercised through the state. Civil society is the arena of those social relationships that are based on consent – e.g., political parties, trade unions, the mass media, civic associations, and the family.

Gramsci originally developed the concept of hegemony in its application to relations among classes and social groups within a nation. But the premise can be applied to international relations, as has been advanced elsewhere in recent international relations and development literature,²⁵ and an "Italian school" has begun to emerge. However, a Gramscian theory of international relations remains sparsely developed, and most work has focused on intra-core and not on core-periphery relations. In the age of transnational political processes, hegemony is exercised in the context of relations among nations and among classes or groups in an international, or transnational, setting. The structures of asymmetry in the international political economy and international relations of power and domination may be exercised or sustained through variants of coercive or consensual mechanisms of transnational social control. Hegemony applied to international relations therefore is not synonymous with the application of power by one nation over others in the context of an unequal distribution of international power and resources. A critical mass of asymmetrical power in international relations may be applied in a myriad of ways that create or sustain asymmetries, such as colonial conquest and direct military intervention. During its "American century," the United States applied such a critical mass of power, both direct (political-military) and indirect (economic), flowing from its location in the world system, to construct global empire and exercise worldwide domination, just as Great Britain did in the nineteenth century.

But this worldwide domination was not necessarily *hegemonic*. In the Gramscian construct, hegemony is one *form* in which nations, or more

precisely, groups operating in a cross-national setting, may exercise their domination in the international arena. My notion of transnational hegemony, therefore, is distinct from that of most world-system, realist, and many Marxist theorists, for whom it is equated with structural domination alone (and who, on that basis, identify a succession of historic “hegemons,” from the Netherlands, to Great Britain, and then to the United States in the twentieth century, and now search for a new global “hegemon” and predict a coming period of core state rivalries²⁶). Transnational domination, in order to be hegemonic, requires the ideological incorporation of both dominant and subordinate groups in the center and periphery. The locus for such a hegemony is a sufficiently developed civil society constituted on the foundations of capitalist production relations. Gramsci contrasted, in this regard, the “gelatinous” civil society of Czarist Russia due to the sparse development of capitalism, and therefore the difficulty in hegemonic control, to the solid hegemonic control achieved in Western Europe, on the foundations of a fully capitalist economy.²⁷ While the process is far from complete, the basis for a transnational hegemony has been gradually laid with the general spread of capitalist production relations into former colonial zones of Africa and Asia following post-WWII decolonization, and a hastened displacement in Latin America in this same period of pre-capitalist, usually tributary production relations (e.g., peasant peonage). This spread of capitalist production relations has accelerated dramatically in the late twentieth century under globalization, and is making possible for the first time in history a hegemonic world order.

Moving “downward” from a structural toward a behavioral perspective, mass movements for the democratization of social life are *threats* to dominant groups in a transnational setting. Yet the earlier authoritarian arrangements are increasingly unable to manage with the complexity of such threats. New modalities of intervention have therefore emerged to face more complex threats. The United States, or transnational dominant classes and groups, may sustain core-periphery relations of domination through “active coercion,” such as direct colonial control, an invasion or CIA-orchestrated coup d’état, and more characteristically, through the promotion of dictatorial or authoritarian social arrangements. Or, transnational social control may be achieved through foreign-policy undertakings intended to bring about the political and ideological incorporation of subordinate groups. The decline in the relative power of the United States and other core states in recent decades, the gradual separation of class power and state power (or the structural power of capital and the direct power of states), the dispersal

of global power to geographically diffuse classes and groups operating in a transnational environment, and the requirement of democratic legitimation, are some factors accounting for the relative decline in the effectiveness of traditional military power and the absolute coercive capacity of the core in the world system.²⁸ Current debate over whether the United States is losing or merely reconfiguring its position as the dominant world power reflects an outdated state-centered approach that fails to appreciate changes in the nature of power under globalization, and which therefore obscures our understanding of the relation between economic and political change in global society.

Structural analysis: Polyarchy and the global economy

The first level of analysis – structure – rests on the material production process as it takes place in the international political economy, and involves an examination of globalization. Hegemony is not simply something that happens as a mere superstructural derivative of economic structures. It is, in large part, the result of a permanent and persuasive *effort*, conducted through a multiplicity of “superstructural” agencies and instances. However, the possibility of hegemonic order is conditioned by the structure of production and social relations that flow from political economy. The defining feature of our epoch is the emergence of a capitalist global economy, which brings with it the material basis for the emergence of a singular global society, including the transnationalization of civil society and of political processes. Nations are no longer linked “externally” to a broader system but “internally” to a singular global social formation. The old units of analysis – nation states – are increasingly inappropriate for understanding the dynamics of our epoch, not only in terms of economic processes, but also social relations and political systems. An examination of the policy shift to “democracy promotion” sheds much light, in a recursive manner, on these dynamics. In theoretical terms, there is a “doubling back” quality between the phenomenon to be explained (“democracy promotion”) and the process in which it is embedded (globalization). The etiology of “democracy promotion” is the historic process of globalization, yet at the same time “democracy promotion” is a transnational political practice that helps shape and facilitate important political dimensions of the globalization process, such as transnational class formation, the externalization of peripheral states, and new forms of articulation between the political and the economic in a cross-national environment. “Promoting democracy” can be con-

ceived as part of an effort to construct hegemony, in the sense meant by Gramsci, within and between nations in the context of the transnationalization of the economy, political processes, and civil societies. The shift from authoritarian to consensual mechanisms of transnational social control corresponds to the emergence of the global economy since the mid-1960s and constitutes a political exigency of macro-economic restructuring on a world scale.²⁹

Globalization comprises two interwoven processes. First is the near-culmination of a process begun several centuries ago, in which capitalist production relations are undermining and supplanting all precapitalist relations across the globe, both in those areas specializing in manufacturing or services and those in primary production. Second is the transition over the past several decades from the linkage of nations via commodity exchange and capital flows in an integrated international market, in which different modes of production coexisted within broader social formations and national and regional economies enjoyed autonomy despite external linkages, to the globalization of the process of production itself. These two processes, taken as integrated historic movement spanning the period from WWII to the present (and still underway), constitute a shift from a *world economy* to a *global economy*. The post-WWII breakup of the colonial system, the spread of multinational capital, and several consecutive waves in the “Scientific and Technological Revolution” (STR), one immediately following WWII and a second starting in the late 1960s, have allowed for the decentralization across the globe of complex production processes simultaneous to the centralization of decision making and management of global production, that is, the complete separation of the site of management from the site of production and the geographic fragmentation of production and of capital.³⁰ Capital is rapidly achieving the means to move with total mobility across the globe in the search for the cheapest labor and the most congenial conditions for the different circuits in the process of production and distribution, without regard for national borders. The spread of capitalist production relations as a result of the breakup of the colonial system and its distinct colonial modes of labor control and property relations, the dramatic rise in direct multinational corporate investment,³¹ an ongoing transfer of labor-intensive phases of international production to the South, the incursion of market relations into the Third World countryside, and so on, accelerated in the late 1960s with new technological changes brought by the second STR (especially, computerization, robotization, informatics, communications, transportation, and new management

techniques). It has allowed for a much more fluid movement of capital and its penetration into diverse regions. Intrinsic to this penetration is the capital-labor relation (i.e., tautologically, the capitalist production relation). (On this process of global proletarianization, see Ronaldo Munck, *The New International Labour Studies*, Zed Press, 1988, especially chapter two). In all four countries examined below, capitalist production relations penetrated pre-capitalist reserves in a dramatic fashion in the post-WWII period, and particularly, from the 1960s and on, breaking up pre-capitalist communities and commodifying economic activities. This resulted in rapid class restructuring, including the accelerated proletarianization of peasant communities and the creation of new rural and urban working classes who became politically mobilized.

Research into this globalization of production has proliferated, but research into the social and political consequences of this process lags behind. The restructuring of the international division of labor, the reorganization of productive structures in each nation, and the global integration of these national production structures, has major consequences for the social and political texture of every society and for the world polity. The hitherto unseen integration of national economies under economic globalization erodes national boundaries and brings with it a tendency towards uniformity, not just in the conditions of production, but in the civil and political superstructure in which social relations of production unfold. The agent of the global economy is transnational capital, managed by a class-conscious transnational elite,³² based in the center countries and led by the United States. The accelerated concentration of capital and economic power around this transnational elite in center countries has profound effects on arrangements between existing social groups, class constellations, and political systems in every country of the world system. Political and economic power tends to gravitate toward new groups linked to transnational capital and the global economy, either directly or through location in reorganized local state apparatuses that function as “transmission belts” for transnational interests.³³ In every region of the world, from Eastern Europe to Latin America, states, economies and political processes are becoming transnationalized and integrated under the guidance of this new elite. This transnational elite has local contingents in each nation of the South, in a new breed of “technocratic” elite in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, or what Sunkel and Fuenzalida call “transnational kernels,”³⁴ who are overseeing sweeping processes of social and economic restructuring.

The transnational elite has an economic project and a political counterpart to that project. The economic project is “neo-liberalism,” a model that seeks to achieve the conditions for the total mobility of capital. This model includes the elimination of state intervention in the economy and the regulation by individual nation states over the activity of capital in their territories. The neo-liberal “structural adjustment” programs currently sweeping the South seek macroeconomic stability (price and exchange-rate stability, etc.) as an essential requisite for the activity of transnational capital, which must harmonize a wide range of fiscal, monetary, and industrial policies among multiple nations, if it is to be able to function simultaneously, and often instantaneously, between numerous national borders. In turn, the political project of this transnational elite is the consolidation of political systems that function through consensual mechanisms of social control, that is, of polyarchic political systems. This elite has become hegemonic, in the Gramscian sense, owing to its structural domination in the world economy combined with the conditions of ideological consensus it has constructed around its dual project of neo-liberalism and polyarchy. It is in this context that “democracy promotion” and the promotion of free markets through neo-liberal restructuring has become a singular process in U.S. foreign policy. The Agency for International Development (AID) explains that promoting democracy in the latter part of the twentieth century “is complementary to and supportive of the transition to market-oriented economies.”³⁵ And a U.S. State Department policy document explains: “Support for democracy is becoming the new organizing principle for American foreign policy.”³⁶

But why consensual over coercive mechanisms of control? Authoritarianism and dictatorship had become a fetter to the emergent patterns of international capital accumulation corresponding to the global economy. Globalizing forces have been disintegrating previously embedded forms of political authority. As Stephen Gill points out, the “globalization thrust of internationally mobile capital [contradicts] the more territorially bounded nature of political authority in the late 20th century.”³⁷ Transnational capital has become sufficiently disruptive and intrusive so as to break down all the old barriers that separated and compartmentalized groups in and between societies, while mass communications is integrating what were once secluded social and cultural experiences of different peoples within the world system, as even the most remote and isolated regions of the world are linked with an increasingly global civilization. As recent literature on transnational communications has explored, the communications revolution has

penetrated virtually every region of the Third World, turning radio, television, print media, and other forms of symbolic exchange that extend beyond local and national borders, into crucial mediums for the development of broader intersubjective communities.³⁸ Diverse demonstration effects and the heightened relative deprivation they generate have implications for social behavior and collective action. The globalization of social life has brought with it new social movements and revolutions in civil society around the world, “stirring” masses of people to rebel against authoritarian arrangements. In short, people have been pushed by the global economy into new roles as economic and social protagonists, and in this process, have been demanding the democratization of social life.

This is what the Trilateral Commission, in its landmark 1975 report *The Crisis of Democracy*, referred to as “the explosion of social interaction, and correlatively a tremendous increase of social pressure.” Social and economic developments in the world over the past several decades “have made it possible for a great many more groups and interests to coalesce . . . the information explosion has made it difficult if not impossible to maintain the traditional distance that was deemed necessary to govern.” The report noted that the “democracy ethos make it difficult to prevent access and restrict information, while the persistence of the bureaucratic processes which have been associated with the traditional governing systems makes it impossible to handle them at a low enough level.”³⁹

In other words, authoritarian political systems are unable to manage the expansive social intercourse associated with the global economy. Social interaction and economic integration on a world scale are obstructed by authoritarian or dictatorial political arrangements. Polyarchy is better equipped under the conditions of social dislocation and political reorganization that accompany each nation’s entrance into the global economy to confront, or at least control, popular sectors and their demands. Polyarchic political systems lend themselves to more durable forms of social control, and therefore to stability. Polyarchy, while mediating inter-class relations, is also a more propitious institutional arrangement for the resolution of conflicts among dominant groups, encouraging the exercise of effective self-control in intra-group affairs. In its ideal-type function, polyarchy achieves intra-elite stability via compromise and accommodation. Under the fluid conditions of an integrated global society, polyarchic political structures are therefore seen as more disposed to diffusing the sharpest social tensions and to

incorporating sufficient social bases with which to sustain stable environments. In this regard, the Trilateral Commission Report emphasized the need to “carry through a basic mutation in (the) mode of social control,” to “experiment with more flexible models that could produce more social control with less coercive pressure.”⁴⁰

Under consolidated capitalism, the political organization of opposition to the capitalist system is generally unfettered, owing to mutually reinforcing *ideological*, *institutional*, and *structural* constraints. Polyarchic political systems tend to set boundaries in which social struggles unfold whose legitimate parameters do not transgress the social order. *Ideological* hegemony is a material force insofar as it orients, and sets limits on, human action by establishing generalized codes of conduct that organize entire populations. Under a hegemonic social order, embedded in ideology are definitions of key political, economic, and philosophical concepts that establish the legitimacy or illegitimacy of demands placed on the social order. Polyarchy places enormous *institutional* constraints on effective opposition to the social order. “Political inclusiveness” (polyarchy’s “first dimension”) is limited to the right to vote, and mass constituencies have no legitimate mechanisms between elections for holding elected officials accountable to them and to the platforms upon which they are elected, since accountability is defined as nothing more than the holding of elections. Equality of conditions for electoral participation is not relevant, and these conditions are decidedly unequal under capitalism owing to the unequal distribution of material and cultural resources among classes and groups, and to the use of economic power to determine political outcomes. But economic considerations are excluded by definition from the polyarchic conception, in which “political contestation” (polyarchy’s “second dimension”) means the juridical right, not the material ability, to become a candidate and vie for power in elections. And the *structural* power of capital tends normally to block or neutralize systemic challenges without recourse to generalized coercion. Gill and Law’s notion of the structural power of transnational capital is an extension to the global environment of similar notions developed by Block, Lindblom, and others of the “veto power” of capital, in which global economic and social forces may exercise veto power or superimpose their power over direct state power exercised in a Weberian sense.⁴¹

Economic globalization involves, in addition, concomitant trends, impossible to explore fully here, that are conducive to more consensual modes of social control in the new global environment, such as the

spread of “post-modern” dominant global culture and global consumption patterns. Sklair analyzes a “culture-ideology of consumerism” associated with global capitalism, disseminated through omnipresent symbols and images made possible by advanced communications technologies. Korzeniewicz has shown that emerging “post-Fordist” patterns of consumption shaped largely by transnational advertising and the use of popular culture in marketing have major consequences for social and economic organization. In my view, the manifest function of a global culture of consumerism and competitive individualism is to market goods and make profits, but its latent political function is to channel mass aspirations into individualist consumer desires and psychologically to disaggregate intersubjectivities. Induced wants depoliticize social behavior and preempt collective action aimed at social change through the fixation of the search for individual consumption and survival, and thus lend themselves to less overtly repressive and more consensual forms of social control.⁴²

Behavioral analysis: Promoting polyarchy as a transnational political practice

At the behavioral level, the promotion of polyarchy⁴³ should be situated within the model of “transnational practices” (TNPs) proposed by Sklair. In his study *Sociology of the Global System*, Sklair argues that the global system as the starting point “is increasingly necessary for the analysis of a growing number of rapidly changing phenomenon”⁴⁴ and may provide a way out of the impasse into which, in his view, globalizing processes have led international relations and development studies. Sklair’s model involves TNPs at three levels: the economic, whose agent is transnational capital; the political, whose agent is a transnational capitalist class; and the cultural, involving a “culture-ideology of consumerism”: “The global system is made up of economic transnational practices and at the highest level of abstraction these are the building blocks of the system. The political practices are the principles of organization of the system. They have to work with the materials on hand, but by manipulating the design of the system they can build variations into it. The cultural-ideological practices are the nuts and bolts and the glue that hold the system together.” But Sklair limits exploration of “transnational political practices” largely to instrumental political pressures exerted by corporate agents, such that transnational corporations and their activity are seen as representing a new political order. What must be problematized is the relation between economic

globalization and political processes and systems as linkages that mediate structure and agency.

There was a chronological disjuncture between the emergence of the global economy and the development of U.S. and core policies in response to globalizing challenges. The methodological point is that there is parallel historical (chronological) movement at the structural and the behavioral levels that cannot be collapsed into one chronology. Change in policy came *after* structural pressures resulting from globalization made themselves felt in a myriad of ways. Behavioral (“super-structural”) changes logically lag behind structural changes, owing in large part to intervening periods in which agency reflects upon structure. Structural and behavioral change became synchronized in the latter part of the 1970s, as a “critical mass” of globalizing pressures, both economic and political, spilled over into entirely new policy orientations. The key moment of transformation in U.S. policy away from authoritarianism and toward promoting polyarchy took place between 1981 and 1985. A chronological reconstruction follows.⁴⁵

The specific period in question runs from the aftermath of WWII until the mid-1980s. The transition from a *world economy* to a *global economy* began with the breakup of the old colonial system following WWII and accelerated from the 1960s and on, as discussed above. Successive U.S. administrations in the 1950s and 1960s voiced concerns over the long-term viability of backing authoritarian regimes, in the face of the upsurge in mass popular movements in the South, and the Kennedy administration’s emphasis in foreign policy on a mixture of counter-insurgency with reform and “democracy” opened a prolonged debate among the extended policymaking community, discussed below, over the prospects of introducing a more systematic program of “promoting democracy” as part of a quest for world order. The 1975 Trilateral Commission report called attention to the general crisis of elite rule in the South that had developed by the 1970s, or to what it termed the “crisis of governability,” and called explicitly for reestablishing global political authority on the basis of a “reconstituted democracy.” The Carter administration’s 1976–1980 “human rights policy” gave a further impetus to a shift toward promoting polyarchy, even though this shift would not actually take place until the next administration. In 1981, the Reagan administration launched *Project Democracy* under the auspices of the National Security Council to develop and implement concrete “democracy promotion” programs, as part of a general U.S. offensive against anti-systemic challenges around the world.⁴⁶ In

June 1982, in a speech before the British Parliament considered the symbolic inauguration of the new policy. President Reagan announced that the United States would pursue a major new program to help “foster the infrastructure of democracy around the world.”⁴⁷ In 1983, the NED was created and other “democracy promotion” programs were introduced into various government agencies and departments. The decisive turning point at the level of policy execution came with the U.S. intervention in the Philippines in 1985 to help to effect a transition from authoritarianism to polyarchy, as discussed below. From that point on, it can be said that the United States had made a systematic switch to promoting polyarchy. Between 1985 and the mid-1990s, some one dozen new agencies or units were created within the U.S. state to conduct programs to promote polyarchy actively. Dozens of such programs were launched around the world in systematic fashion, as part of the consolidation and institutionalization of the new policy.⁴⁸ Let us now undertake a more nuanced analysis of this behavioral chronology.

Domhoff and Dye have shown the foreign policymaking process to be tightly controlled by an inner circle of political, business, and intellectual elites scattered throughout the organs of the U.S. state, the corporate echelons, and a handful of elite policy-planning institutes and universities. State managers are “proximate policymakers” that constitute only the final phase of a complex policymaking process largely determined by forces in civil society, and at whose apex are the agents of corporate capital.⁴⁹ Final policy outcomes (in this case, the 1981–1985 shift to promoting polyarchy) often come *after* prolonged periods of strategic, and often acrimonious debate, within the extended policymaking community, comprising state managers, the corporate elite, and organic intellectuals (in the Gramscian sense) in the state, quasi-governmental and private policy-planning institutes, foundations, and universities. Such a debate took place within this community between the 1960s and the early 1980s. It analyzed the dramatic changes in the international correlation of forces simultaneous to new challenges raised by subordinate groups in the world system for a redistribution of resources and the democratization of social life. This community also perceived the increasing structural power of transnational capital and the emergence of transnational forces in the wake of globalization, including reconfigured transnational blocs. It explored the prospects for new forms of transnational political organization.⁵⁰ Policymakers sought to adjust policies related to the reproduction of order in an increasingly integrated and conflict-ridden global society, and to develop policies calibrated to changing global circumstances.⁵¹

The Trilateral Commission and Council on Foreign Relations reports are properly seen as analysis by organic intellectuals that reflects upon structure in order to orient policy, and therefore expresses a linkage between the two levels of analysis. Perhaps more important were a series of follow-up studies conducted in the late 1970s. One set, sponsored by the Trilateral Commission, was known as “Towards a Renovated International System,” and the other, by the Council on Foreign Relations, as the “1980s Project.”⁵² These studies explored formulas for reconstituting world order in light of globalization, and called specifically for implementation of the transnational agenda discussed above. This included a “moderate international order,” which meant a world economic environment in which state and other barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, and technology would be dismantled (neo-liberalism), a new international division of labor in which labor-intensive phases of world production would be transferred to the South, and reiterated the earlier Trilateral Commission report for reconstituted “democracy.” These watershed reports were part of the gradual process of rethinking within the extended policymaking community, from the 1960s into the 1980s.

This process of rethinking included, specifically, a long-running debate over the most appropriate types of political systems for achieving stability and social control in the Third World. Among state managers, this debate focused on whether state policy should support “democracy” or bolster authoritarianism. Among intellectuals in academia and the policymaking community, the debate was played out in the literature on political development, which explored the relation between political systems and social order.⁵³ In his classic 1968 study, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington, a political scientist and consultant for several U.S. administrations, argued that modernization (capitalist development) brought social disruptions and new demands on the political system that threatened stability and that were best managed through authoritarian political structures. Political scientist William Douglas, who was also a consultant to the State Department on “democracy promotion” policies, argued precisely the opposite in his 1972 book, *Developing Democracy*. In his study, Douglas coined the term *regimented democracy* to describe the type of political system the U.S. should promote in place of authoritarianism.⁵⁴ Comparing the populations of developing nations with “children,” and underdevelopments as a result of their “traditional attitudes,” Douglas argued that the peoples of the Third World required “tutelage,” “regimentation,” and “social control,” but that “democracy” could achieve these goals

more effectively than authoritarianism. “That a firm hand is needed is undeniable,” but “democracy can provide a sufficient degree of regimentation, if it can build up the mass organizations needed to reach the bulk of the people on a daily basis. Dictatorship has no monopoly on the tutelage principle.”⁵⁵

Those favoring “democracy promotion” in both policymaking and intellectual circles emphasized the need to develop new modalities, instruments, and agencies for actually accomplishing the transition, in intervened countries in the Third World, from authoritarian to polyarchic political systems. This reorientation entailed, in particular, the introduction and expansion of an underdeveloped and underutilized instrument in U.S. foreign policy, *political aid*, which has come to supplement the two main tools of U.S. foreign policy since World War II – military and economic aid programs. Between World War II and 1990, the U.S. spent some \$400 billion in foreign military and economic aid (over a trillion dollars at 1990 dollars).⁵⁶ An important purpose of military aid was to bolster local repressive forces that could suppress dissent and maintain social control. U.S. economic aid programs, beyond gaining political influence, were intended to integrate the economies of recipient countries into the world capitalist market. The shift to promoting polyarchy has *not* eclipsed the two traditional foreign policy instruments, which remain central to foreign policy. However, as Douglas and others argued, the key ingredient was the systematic introduction of this third category and the creation of new state agencies to administer “political aid” programs.⁵⁷

In his 1972 book, Douglas developed detailed recommendations on how “political aid” programs should be introduced. Just as economic aid addressed economic underdevelopment, stated Douglas, political aid “should address political underdevelopment.”⁵⁸ Overcoming political underdevelopment, said Douglas, would require “transplanting mechanisms” for establishing polyarchy in the Third World.⁵⁹ Included among the recommendations were: the establishment of a specialized agency (later to become the NED); the participation of the private sector in “democracy promotion” abroad; and the modification of existing government institutions and programs so as to synchronize overall foreign policy with “political aid.” Two decades after his study, the “transplanting mechanisms” and “insulating devices,” which Douglas called for, became embodied in the new “democracy promotion” programs. Douglas went on to become a senior consultant to the NSC’s Project Democracy. As a result, several specialized programs and en-

tities with a focus on political aid came into existence in the 1980s and 1990s, most notably the NED and the State Department's Center for Democratic Governance. Specifically, funding and political guidance for political parties, trade unions, business groups, mass media, and civic organizations have been expanded and integrated into multi-dimensional U.S. "democracy promotion" undertakings. These complex undertakings have been well-documented elsewhere.⁶⁰ Political aid, administered through the NED and other channels, has become a sophisticated instrument for penetrating the political systems and civil societies in other countries down to the grassroots level, and for linking them to external constituencies and agendas of an increasingly transnationalized extended state.

NED president Carl Gershman has categorized programs into those aimed at "long-term democratic political development," and those aimed at securing a "democratic transition," that is, a change of regime.⁶¹ The first category refers to programs to stabilize and consolidate polyarchic political systems in societies already considered "democratic" by bolstering elite forces in political and civil society, and by inculcating what the operatives and theoreticians of this new political intervention consider to be the "political culture" of polyarchy. Programs under this category in the 1990s include most Latin American nations, as well as the former Soviet bloc countries, which were considered "democratic." Regarding the second category, "transitions to democracy," U.S. policymakers identify two types of transitions: from authoritarian or right-wing dictatorships, to elitist civilian regimes; and from left-wing, popular, nationalist, or socialist regimes considered adversaries, to elitist regimes allied with the U.S.-led transnational elite. Chile, Haiti, Paraguay, and the Philippines, fell under the first type in the 1980s, and in the 1990s, many African and several Asian nations fall under this type. Nicaragua fell under the second, as did programs in Haiti under President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and programs in Cuba in the late 1980s and 1990s. This new political intervention is more sophisticated than earlier forms of intervention by the United States and other former colonial powers. The process is not a conspiratorial design hatched in Washington and other Northern capitals, and involves more than "demonstration elections."⁶² It represents a complex convergence of interests among an increasingly cohesive transnational elite headed by a U.S.-led Northern bloc and incorporating elite constituencies in the South. In this scenario, the demands, grievances, and aspirations of the popular classes tend to become neutralized or redirected less through direct repression than through ideologi-

cal mechanisms, political cooptation, and the limits imposed by the global economy and the legitimizing parameters of polyarchy. This undertaking *does* require the development of *formal* democratic structures (that is, the institutions of a polyarchic political system).

This new intervention is conducted through the full panoply of U.S. foreign policy instruments, and “political aid” programs have not substituted, but rather been integrated into, military and economic support programs.⁶³ As it actually functions, it sets about not just to secure and stabilize polyarchy but to have the U.S. and local elites thoroughly penetrate not just the state, but civil society – the site of a Gramscian hegemony – and *from therein* exercise control over popular mobilization and mass movements. This is a change from social control “from above” to social control “from below” (and within), for the purpose of managing change and reform, preempting any elemental challenge to the social order. This explains why this new political intervention does not target governments per se, but groups in civil society, such as trade unions, political parties, the media, and women’s, student, and other mass organizations. In countries subject to U.S. “democracy promotion” programs, civil society is the target of penetration as the locus of a Gramscian hegemony. As two Project Democracy consultants explained: “The new policy instrument – aid to friendly political organizations abroad – [...] helps build up political actors in other polities, rather than merely seeking to influence existing ones.”⁶⁴

The actual *modality* of “democracy promotion” is a complex transnational political practice: the U.S. state provides funding and organizational resources to a wide range of groups in U.S. civil society, including U.S. business groups, branches of the AFL-CIO, the Democratic and Republican parties, and other private and quasi-governmental civic groups. These ostensibly private organs of U.S. civil society become intermeshed with branches of the formal state apparatus through a variety of mechanisms, including interlocking directorates, joint decision-making processes, and private dependency on government funds. Programs originating in the U.S. state are then carried out by these groups, in close coordination with U.S. state policy in the intervened country. These programs support existing groups, or create new groups entirely from scratch, in the civil society of the target country, in synchronization with U.S. state operations at the level of political society. The actual content of programs range from education and training, institution building, social projects, information dissemination, visitor exchanges, political action, and so forth, and involve deep cultural-

ideological dimensions alongside the institutional. Complex and multi-layered nexuses develop between the civil and political society of target countries and the organs of the U.S. state and civil society operating in conjunction. At the conceptual level, these operations help to externalize civil and political societies in the periphery through transnational political practices intended to promote transnational *hegemony*.

These operations became most prominent in those countries where social movements, scattered protests, and pressures for democratic change had begun to coalesce into mass national democratization movements, such as in the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua, and Haiti. The immediate purpose of U.S. intervention in these national democratization movements was to gain influence over them and try to shape their outcomes in such a way as to preempt more radical political changes and fundamental challenges to the socioeconomic order. Beyond this immediate purpose, “democracy promotion” was aimed at advancing the agenda in intervened countries of the transnational elite – consolidation of poly-archic political systems and neo-liberal restructuring.

Some empirical reference points

This section draws on a mounting body of empirical studies on U.S. “democracy promotion” undertakings in different countries. The unit of analysis in these empirical points of reference is not national democratization movements per se, which are complex endogenous developments, but specifically U.S. intervention in these transitions as examples of “democracy promotion.” I focus special attention on the Philippines as an operationalization of theoretical propositions because the successful outcome of the crisis of dictatorial rule there, and the contribution made by new forms of U.S. political intervention to that outcome, proved decisive in consolidating consensus among U.S. state managers around the shift in policy.

The Philippines

The U.S. conquest and colonization of the Philippines following the 1898–1902 Spanish-American War gave continuity to an internal system of coercive colonial control established by the Spanish. The basis of a tenuous Philippine stability following independence in 1946

was the alliance between the U.S. state and an upperclass Philippine elite that had developed under tutelage of U.S. and Spanish colonialism. As U.S. and other foreign investment poured in, the economy grew to the benefit of foreign capital and the Philippine elite simultaneous to the impoverishment of the majority and deep social polarization.⁶⁵ The declaration of martial law by Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 and subsequent crackdown of the popular movement, with explicit U.S. support,⁶⁶ was foremost a means for the Philippine elite and the U.S. to face the crisis-level challenge of a popular rebellion against the status quo. The post-colonial order thus rested on an “elective affinity” between increasingly internationalized capital operating in the Philippines and an authoritarian internal political system. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States sustained its support for Marcos and authoritarianism as the preferred instrument of social control.

Nonetheless, as Marcos converted his rule into the most vulgar form of “crony capitalism,” similar to that of the Somozas in Nicaragua or the Duvaliers in Haiti, corruption and the spoils of state became monopolized by the dictator’s own family and clique. Far from resolving the crisis of elite rule, authoritarian political structures ended up rupturing minimal intra-elite consensus and accommodation necessary for stability. Moreover, “crony capitalism,” by disturbing free markets, eventually became a hindrance to transnational capital and neo-liberal restructuring in the Philippines as the global economy emerged.⁶⁷ And the crackdown, rather than suppressing the popular movement, gave further impetus to it, spawning a leftist insurgency and galvanizing a powerful and well-organized opposition movement of popular and leftist forces. The August 1983 assassination by Marcos henchmen of the most prominent leader of the elite opposition, former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., aroused the non-Marcos elite into active opposition. The middle classes soon joined the popular sectors in massive street demonstrations and a burgeoning nationwide movement for democratization ensued. By the early 1980s, observers began to speak of the coming Philippine revolution.

In theoretical perspective, developments from Philippine independence after World War II to the early 1980s reflected a gradual process of transition from a formal colonial relationship with the United States to a country’s entrance into the emergent global economy as a dependent and peripheral country, with concomitant social and political repercussions. From a more narrow appendage of the U.S. economy, the Philippines was becoming a haven for transnational corporate capi-

tal, which poured into the country from the 1960s and on. The earlier colonial relationship was based, for the most part, on feudal and semi-feudal production relations in much of the Philippines, and on the provision on the part of the Philippines of raw materials for the U.S. metropolitan power. In this way, a largely pre-capitalist social formation in the periphery was articulated to a capitalist social formation in the core. The penetration of transnational capital, starting in the 1960s, disrupted rural communities as it forged new solidarities and mobilization among subordinate classes in these communities and in expanding urban communities.⁶⁸ The internal political structure of authoritarianism, and the “crony capitalism” tendencies that authoritarianism tends to generate, had served the purpose of social control in the first few decades of this process. But as this process unfolded, authoritarianism proved unable to respond to the twin challenges of containing popular pressures from below generated by capitalist penetration and of providing mechanisms for intra-elite accommodation.

Shifting from this structural to behavioral analysis, U.S. policymakers were witness to a dual crisis in the making in the early 1980s: an irreconcilable inter-elite split alongside a burgeoning popular movement and armed insurgency. It was the same type of pre-revolutionary situation that had developed in Nicaragua and led to the Sandinista triumph in 1979. State managers in Washington engaged in a brief yet heated debate over whether to intervene actively in the Philippines to redirect the anti-dictatorial struggle.⁶⁹ Behind this debate loomed the larger issue discussed earlier of debate over the merits of authoritarian versus polyarchic methods of transnational social control. U.S. policy shifted between 1983–1985 from unqualified support for the dictatorship to active and critical intervention in the country’s political affairs to facilitate Marcos’ removal and to manage a high-risk transition from dictatorship to polyarchy.⁷⁰ The challenge for U.S. state managers became: 1) to transfer support from Marcos to the anti-Marcos elite; 2) to assure that the anti-Marcos elite would gain hegemony over the anti-dictatorial struggle and; 3) to reconstruct consensual polyarchic behavior among the elite as a whole. Parallel to pressures on Marcos, the U.S. began to develop broad contacts with the elite political and military opposition as a counterweight to the popular sectors, a strategy detailed in a secret November 1984 NSC Study Directive later made public.⁷¹

In the weeks before and after the February 1985 elections, the Philippines was swept by what became known as “people power.” Filipinos

voted en masse for Corazon Aquino, the wife of the assassinated Benigno, who enjoyed broad popular support as a symbol of the anti-dictatorial movement, and then launched a popular insurrection when, in the face of widespread fraud, Marcos declared himself the winner. Faced with this mass, popular uprising, U.S. actions sought to control its development and minimize its effects. U.S. officials sought to assure an important role for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Key AFP officers, in consultation with U.S. military advisors and diplomats, led a revolt against Marcos's attempt to steal the elections, an event that, coupled with U.S. diplomatic pressure, convinced Marcos to step down and leave the country. The military revolt assured the preservation of the repressive armed forces and left Aquino more indebted to, and dependent on, the conservative military than to the popular movement. The preservation of the coercive apparatus during the transition period, and the active role played by the "armor of coercion" during and after the transition, placed clear limits on social transformation and demands for equity in the post-Marcos period.

The measure of U.S. influence in the outcome of the anti-dictatorial movement became a hotly debated issue in both Washington and Manila. But whether or not U.S. intervention was itself the determinant factor in the overthrow of Marcos obscured a much more significant issue: U.S. intervention was decisive in shaping the contours of the anti-Marcos movement and in limiting popular democratization in the post-Marcos era. By 1983 it had become clear that the dictatorship's days were numbered. From that point on, the underlying issue was not whether Marcos would go but what would take the dictatorship's place. The underlying struggle shifted from democracy versus dictatorship to the terms and outcome of the anti-dictatorial movement and the reach of the Philippine democratization process. By accelerating the removal of Marcos before further polarization could take place, by helping to supplant popular with elite leadership in the anti-Marcos movement, by preserving the integrity of the armed forces, and so on, the United States was able to channel the anti-Marcos movement into a less threatening outcome, and then to win more favorable circumstances for shaping the post-Marcos period. This period involved continued U.S. intervention aimed at diminishing left and popular influence in the new government, reconstructing consensus within the dominant groups around a polyarchic political system, and building up allied constituencies in Philippine civil and political society. It also involved launching a sweeping program of neo-liberal restructuring by the new government under the guidance of the AID and the multilateral lending agencies.⁷²

Political aid and the new modalities of intervention discussed above began to play an important role from 1984 and on. The U.S. government allocated at least \$9 million between 1984 and 1990 to the NED and the AID for Philippine civic and political organizations⁷³ and then allocated another \$12 million in such “democracy enhancement” funds in 1990 for the AID and the NED to spend in “democratic institution building [in conjunction with] a strong free-market private-sector orientation.”⁷⁴ While the opposition forces were diverse and well-organized, the weakest among them were the center and conservative sectors. As in Nicaragua and other authoritarian Third World regimes, these sectors had vacillated during many years between support for, and opposition to, the dictatorship. It was precisely these sectors that the United States set about to develop through new political aid programs targeting civil society. These included: the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which mobilized the business community against Marcos, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), a minority, conservative union federation that had supported the Marcos regime and that competed with more radical and left-leaning labor organizations; Philippine “youth clubs” established under the guidance of U.S. organizers to mobilize Philippine youth in high schools and colleges; the KABATIB Philippine women’s organization (KABATIB is the Tagalog acronym for “Women’s Movement for the Nurturing of Democracy”), also established under the guidance of U.S. organizers, and the National Movement for Free Elections (NAM-FREL).⁷⁵ These novel political aid programs were crucial in galvanizing elite constituencies in civil society against Marcos *and* against popular pressures. They also played an important role in helping this elite to gain *hegemony* – in the Gramscian sense, not of *domination* but of *leadership*, over the multi-class, multi-sectoral mass movement and over the fragile state apparatus that had come under dispute.

For instance, assistance for the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) had “the overall goal [of providing] support [to] the restoration of private-enterprise values in place of the ‘crony capitalism’ system as a key element in the overall transition to democracy,” stated a NED report.⁷⁶ “Crony capitalism” was to be replaced not by any popular economic program but by free-market reforms and deeper integration of the Philippines into the global economy.⁷⁷ Similarly, the Philippines had the broadest and most vibrant feminist movement in Asia, but the existing women’s movement put forth a clear program of popular democracy.⁷⁸ The KABATID set out to promote this agenda, and to *compete* with the existing women’s movement. U.S. political-aid

programs provided the resources and political training for women from the country's elite to network and become mobilized,⁷⁹ and to "counteract the powerful propaganda machine of Left forces"⁸⁰ through KABATID leadership well-placed in the country's civil and political society. This was part of the broader efforts to cohere a "political center" and have it exercise hegemony in the organs of civil society and the internal political system. KABATID documents stressed "the creation of a visible middle force," the "bonding together of women" around "a visibly moderate force," the creation of "circles of influence" around the country, training for KABATID members in "leadership skills and value orientation," and exercising a "catalyst function" in the formation of public opinion over national issues.⁸¹ Regarding labor, eight anti-Marcos union federations, disenchanted with the TUCP's pro-Marcos program, had set up the Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement), or KMU, in 1981. The KMU became the largest anti-Marcos union center and one of the most dynamic in the world. It waged campaigns in the late 1980s for national control over natural resources, the removal of all U.S. military bases, an agrarian reform, worker participation and improvements in wages and benefits.⁸² Between 1984 and 1990 the TUCP became the second largest recipient of NED funds worldwide, surpassed only by Poland's Solidarity.⁸³ NED reports made clear that the main objective of the program was to counter left-wing unionism.⁸⁴ One NED document stated: "A variety of approaches will be used to reach disparate groups of workers. These efforts will directly address KMU attempts to bring workers in specific industries in key economic sectors under their control [sic] ... [and] will allow the TUCP to supplant the KMU as the spokesman for working men and women in the Philippines."⁸⁵

Through these efforts, the TUCP, the KABATID, the PCCI, and other groups supported through U.S. political-aid programs garnered a working-class base of support in urban areas for a gradual realignment of the Aquino coalition from the center-left to toward the center-right, and pushed the post-Marcos agenda of polyarchy and neo-liberalism. Political aid, in conjunction with economic and military aid, was not the determinant, but one of several interwoven endogenous and exogenous factors affecting the outcome of the transition. This transition involved the ascent to internal leadership of a transnationalized fraction of the Philippine elite over the elite as a whole, and the ideological and political incorporation, or at least neutralization, of enough of the popular sectors to restore social order in the wake of the Marcos crisis. This "transnational kernel" in formation set about to gain leverage over the

state and to position itself to exercise hegemony in civil society, although space constraints limit further discussion here.

After six years in power, amidst a precarious period of mass mobilization, attempted coups, and the ebb and flow of insurgency and counter-insurgency, Aquino left office in 1992 in elections that brought Gen. Fidel Ramos, a close associate of Marcos who broke with the dictator in his final hours to lead the military revolt, to the presidency. The 1986 “revolution” had been divested of its popular promises and polyarchy seemingly institutionalized. On the one hand, there was electoral competition and constitutional rule, including a separation of powers, formal respect for civil and political liberties, and so on. Although still factionalized, the elite had apparently reached consensus on the rules of polyarchic competition, which became quite intense, with a thriving press and a plethora of political parties. On the other hand, after six years, social and economic structures remained frozen and the formal political system continued to be a domain of the rich and powerful, as closed as ever to meaningful popular participation.⁸⁶ A series of studies conducted by Philippine and foreign scholars in different rural and urban locations around the Philippines in the late 1980s on the actual extent of social, economic, and political change concluded: “The overwhelming evidence shows that what was achieved by Aquino replacing Marcos is much more modest than what is suggested by the notion of ‘a transition from authoritarianism to democracy’ . . . no decisive reform of iniquitous social structures has taken place.”⁸⁷

Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti

In Chile, the United States, after orchestrating the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government, provided consistent support for the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. The Pinochet dictatorship decimated the left as a precondition for beginning the massive neo-liberal restructuring of the Chilean economy and the insertion of the country into the emergent global economy. By 1983, however, the popular movement had recovered and a mass protest movement erupted against the dictatorship. The United States continued support for the regime until 1985, when it abruptly shifted support to the elite opposition and began to promote a transition. The Chilean transition has been well documented,⁸⁸ but the role of “democracy promotion” programs in it has received less attention. From 1985 and on, the United States applied a myriad of carrot-and-stick pressures on the regime to

open up and to transfer power to civilian elites.⁸⁹ Simultaneous to these pressures, it implemented political-aid programs through the AID and the NED to help organize and guide the coalition that ran against Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite and against the dictatorship's candidates in the 1990 general elections.⁹⁰ U.S. political intervention played a key role in achieving unity among a splintered elite opposition, in eclipsing the popular opposition, and in assuring elite hegemony over the anti-dictatorial movement between 1985 and 1987, when this hegemony was in dispute. It also played an important role between 1987 and 1990 in consolidating a reconstituted elite and in placing a "trans-national kernel," committed to the process begun under Pinochet of far-reaching neo-liberal restructuring and integration into the global economy, to a position of leadership among the new civilian authorities.⁹¹

In Nicaragua, the U.S. supported the Somoza family dictatorship for nearly five decades. Foreign capital poured into Central America in the 1960s and 1970s, integrating the region into the global economy and laying the structural basis for the social upheavals of the 1980s. The Sandinista government, which came to power in the 1979 revolution, became the target of a massive U.S. destabilization campaign.⁹² In 1987, the objective of this campaign changed dramatically, from a military overthrow of the Sandinistas by an externally-based counter-revolutionary movement seeking an authoritarian restoration, to new forms of political intervention in support of an internal "moderate" opposition. This opposition, organized and trained through large-scale U.S. political-aid programs, operated through peaceful (non-coercive) means in civil society to undermine Sandinista hegemony. These were the same elite civilian groups that had opposed the Somoza dictatorship in its final years but – unlike the Philippines – had not been able to gain hegemony over the anti-dictatorial movement and thus to prevent a Sandinista victory. The shift from hard-line destabilization to "democracy promotion," culminating in the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, a conservative restoration and the installation of a polyarchic political system, the reinsertion of Nicaragua into the global economy, and far-reaching neo-liberal restructuring, has been well-documented elsewhere.⁹³

In Haiti, the United States sustained the Duvalier dictatorship at the same time as it promoted a development model in the 1960s and 1970s which inserted the country into the emergent global economy as an export-assembly platform and facilitated the thorough penetration

of capitalist production relations into the countryside. This model helped uproot the rural peasantry – a class that had constituted the backbone of the social order for nearly two centuries – and hastened a mass movement against the dictatorship.⁹⁴ In early 1986 a popular uprising brought down the Duvalier regime. In the Philippines and Chile, elites had gained enough hegemony over the anti-dictatorial movement to secure a polyarchic outcome, and in Nicaragua the Sandinistas led popular sectors in a revolutionary outcome. In Haiti, however, neither elite nor popular forces could gain any decisive hegemony. The elite was fragmentary and wedded to authoritarianism, and a small “transnational kernel” was poorly-organized. Popular forces had no unifying political organization, program, or leadership that could facilitate a bid for power. Haiti became submerged in a national power vacuum and a cauldron of turmoil between 1986–1990. During this period, the United States introduced a massive “democracy promotion” program to cultivate a polyarchic elite and place it in power through U.S.-organized elections. The liberation theologian Jean-Bertrand Aristide defeated Marc Bazin, who had been carefully groomed in U.S. political-aid programs, in the 1990 elections.⁹⁵ This was an upset for the U.S. program, but Aristide was overthrown in a 1991 military coup d’état, which was not obstructed by the United States, in contrast to U.S. suppression of the string of coup attempts against Aquino in the Philippines. The return of Aristide to office as a lame-duck president through a U.S. invasion in September 1994 underscored a complex ongoing scenario in Haiti whereby the conditions for a stable polyarchic system continued to elude the United States yet neither elite nor popular forces could achieve any hegemonic order.⁹⁶

Tentative conclusions and directions for future research

In none of the preceding cases, it should be stressed, did the United States obtain its ideal outcome. But U.S. intervention was successful to the extent that it helped to limit the extent of popular change that took place through transitions from authoritarianism, to disaggregate popular and revolutionary movements, to strengthen allied classes and their ideological and institutional mechanisms of social control in post-authoritarian environments, and to preserve or reconstruct repressive apparatuses as latent coercion (consensus protected by armor). Although space allows for only brief looks at four countries here, the scope of U.S. undertakings to promote polyarchy indicates that this is not a short-term policy. Between 1984 and 1992, the NED and other

branches of the U.S. state were conducting “democracy promotion” programs in 109 countries around the world. These included 30 countries in Africa, 24 countries in Asia, 24 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, eight countries in the Middle East, and 26 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁹⁷ The promotion of polyarchy is a policy initiative that is becoming internationalized under U.S. leadership. Other core countries set up their own government-linked “democracy promotion” agencies in the early 1990s and launched programs to intervene in the political systems and civil societies of the Third World in conjunction with U.S. programs.⁹⁸ Inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Economic Community established “democracy units” whose functions ranged from local assistance for elections to mechanisms for coordinated international diplomatic pressures against states that threatened to relapse from polyarchic to authoritarian governments.⁹⁹ The multilateral lending agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank, have proposed making multilateral aid, bilateral aid, and access to international financial markets in general conditional upon a polyarchic system in the recipient country. These diverse developments underscore efforts to institutionalize a polyarchic global political system under the hegemony of the transnational elite, linked, in turn, to structural pressures flowing from globalization. Further research should problematize the boundaries between the national and the transnational at the level of political systems and civil society. This should involve elaborating the connections between an emergent transnational extended state and existing national state-civil society clusters, and as well, the complex of economic, political, and social connections that link national groups and classes to transnational class formation. An internationalized extended state need not take the shape of a formal institutional apparatus as such. It may be more appropriate to conceptualize, as Cox has suggested, a global extended state as cross-national linkages in which transnational practices are operationalized through nation-states and their modified institutions.¹⁰⁰

At a deeper theoretical level, I advance, as a proposition to be developed in future research, that the displacement of all pre-capitalist relations under the global economy is bringing into relief the historic “elective affinity” between capitalism and polyarchy. This much-debated relationship (which requires deeper theorization beyond the classical studies on capitalism and democracy in Europe and contemporary studies on “preconditions” in the periphery) may be playing itself out

now on a global scale, as capitalism comes to supplant all precapitalist social relations in a *global* setting, and also to integrate national economies and societies into a single global social formation. Seen from a long-historic lens, the concentration of the dominant capitalist mode in the core and semi- or pre-capitalist modes in the periphery had as its political counterpart the tendency toward consensual mechanisms of social control in the core and coercive mechanisms in the periphery. Barrington Moore's classic study and more recent attempts to pinpoint the relationship between capitalist development and democracy¹⁰¹ need to be recast in light of globalization, and situated within historic processes of capital accumulation that were formerly concentrated spatially in particular regions and that now tends toward global fragmentation with consequent political implications.¹⁰² By breaking down the autonomy of national political systems and civil societies, globalization is increasingly making it impossible to sustain distinct political systems. Economic globalization thus generates pressures for integration into a single "political regime." Polyarchy is the emergent global political "superstructure" of the emergent global economy. World order should not be conceived as the absence of conflict but as stable patterns of social relations around a global production process. Globalization provides the basis for the first time in history for world order based on a Gramscian hegemony.

Further research also needs to delineate the relative weight of structural and behavioral contributions to specific outcomes and to the prospects for the consolidation of a global polyarchy. The prospects for a global polyarchy may depend less on structure than on agency. In this regard, a pressing issue for future research is the potential for transnational counterhegemonic projects. Left and popular forces remain vital and even ascendant in many countries in the Third World. Yet they appear unable to find a formula for operating effectively in the new political-ideological terrain – a challenge posed for much of the left internationally in the age of globalization and that is closely related to the lack of any viable programmatic alternative to integration into global free-market capitalism. Attempts to challenge elites within the bounds of polyarchic systems run up against the vastly superior resources of the elite, as well as direct repression, which, although more low-key and selective than under dictatorship, remains systematic in much of the periphery. Behind these obstacles for the left are two closely related constraints to popular social change in the new world order. One is the structural power of transnational capital in the global economy, along with the political and ideological power it gives elites

tied directly and indirectly to transnational capital. The other is the institution of polyarchy, which provides an immanent class advantage to those who command superior resources. Both these constraints lend themselves to non-coercive mechanisms of social control, and therefore, to elite hegemony. In this regard, the focus on “democracy promotion” and globalization presented in this article may contribute new perspectives to the rich sociological literature on revolutions, and particularly, to recent works on late twentieth-century revolutionary movements in the Third World.¹⁰³ Although this is not the place for such discussion, the issues raised here may in particular provide a much needed corrective to macrostructural approaches to revolution, e.g., how the changing world-historic context of revolutions combines with changes in strategy among transnational elites (international actors) to influence revolutionary outcomes dramatically.

On the other hand, intent at the behavioral level does not necessarily translate into ability at the structural level. Authoritarianism has persisted in many African and Asian states despite U.S. and core efforts, and we should not rule out a reversion to, or persistence of, authoritarian systems. The correlation between deepening socioeconomic inequalities and the breakdown of polyarchy has been well established in the sociological literature.¹⁰⁴ By its very nature, the neo-liberal model is designed to prevent any interference with the workings of the free market, including state redistributive policies and structural transformations that could counterbalance the tendency inherent in capitalism toward a concentration of income and productive resources. The neo-liberal model therefore generates the seeds of social instability and conditions propitious to the breakdown of polyarchy. This is a contradiction internal to the transnational elite’s project. “Democracy promotion” might run up against the structural impossibility of containing within the bounds of polyarchy demands placed on states. These contradictions, although the subject of another article, raise issues as to the *viability* of the transnational elite project. Seen in structural perspective, it is not at all clear that polyarchy will be able to absorb the social and political conflict generated by inequalities that the global free market model reproduces and aggravates. Transitions to polyarchy might thus prove more effective in the long run in resolving intra-elite crises than in resolving the crisis of elite domination.

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Notes

1. See, e.g., Ralph M. Goldman and William A. Douglas, *Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues* (New York: Praeger, 1988); Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, D.C., The AEI Press, 1992).
2. See, e.g., Abraham Lowenthal, editor, *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the World-wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994); Howard J. Wiarda, *The Democratic Revolution in Latin America: History, Politics and U.S. Policy* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991).
3. Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).
4. Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16/2 (1987): 215–229.
5. As cited in C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 122–123.
6. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1970), and *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
7. See, e.g., Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," *International Studies Quarterly* 33/4 (1989): 475–499; Gill and Law, *The Global Political Economy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), referred to hereafter as *PPWO*; William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," *International Organization* 47/1 (Winter 1993): 139–174; Bjorn Hettne (editor), *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder* (London: Zed Press, 1995); David C. Ranney, *The Evolving Supra-National Policy Arena* (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Center for Urban Economic Development, 1993).
8. For discussion, see, e.g., Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938–1980* (New York: Penguin, 1983); William Blum, *The CIA:*

- A Forgotten History* (London, Zed Press, 1986); Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989).
9. James F. Petras and Morris H. Morley, "The U.S. Imperial State," in Petras et al., *Class, State and Power in the Third World* (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun, and Publishers, 1981).
 10. As cited in Noam Chomsky, *The Culture of Terrorism* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 2.
 11. To be sure, Soviet and Western competition over international ideological allegiances, in both the First and the Third Worlds, are not irrelevant to the issue at hand. On several occasions in the twentieth century, for instance, U.S. policymakers declared campaigns to "promote democracy" around the world as part of broad programs to counteract popular and revolutionary threats to the capitalist world order. Woodrow Wilson's "crusade for democracy," launched shortly after the Bolshevik revolution, was an early effort to counteract the ideological appeal of the Bolshevik revolution and the very real threat that the revolution would spread through Europe. And U.S. policymakers similarly emphasized "democracy" as part of the early post-WWII campaign to undermine the ideological appeal and legitimacy socialism had gained as a result of the wartime Allied-Soviet alliance, and to lay the ideological basis for the launching by the United States of the Cold War. However, these campaigns *did not actually result in a change from coercive to consensual mechanisms of social control in the periphery*. Regarding Wilson's "crusade" as a response to the Bolshevik revolution, see, e.g., Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London: Verso, 1984). On early 1950s U.S. policy and the launching of the Cold War, see, among many excellent works, Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993); and McCormick, *America's Half-Century*.
 12. See Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).
 13. National Security Council Memorandum NSC-68, Dated April 7, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1950, Volume I, NSC-68, pp. 252, 263, 272. (The document runs from 235–292).
 14. Of course, the United States has also had its share of blatant racist colonial ideologies akin to Europe's "Civilizing Missions" and "White Man's Burden," such as the "Manifest Destiny."
 15. This despite U.S. assistance in the removal of a few individual dictators (e.g., Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Jimenez in Venezuela). Several pre-1980s efforts at "democracy promotion" were selective attempts to remove a few specific regimes and did not alter the fundamental "elective affinity" between U.S. domination and authoritarianism. The Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, for instance, was launched in the wake of the 1959 Cuban revolution, just as Wilson's "crusade for democracy" was launched in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, to preempt further revolutionary change in the hemisphere through a combination of reform and counterinsurgency. But the counterinsurgency side of the equation quickly gained supremacy, and "democracy," however so defined, soon fell by the wayside as U.S. state managers aligned with repressive authoritarian states in the effort to suppress insurgencies.
 16. Cited in Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London: Verso, 1984), 181.

17. Some of the symptoms of this crisis were the Cuban revolution in 1959, the 1970s victory of the socialist Salvador Allende in Chile (and the damage to U.S. legitimacy internationally that his overthrow and the exposure of the U.S. role involved), the defeat of the U.S. followed by the fall of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975, mass protests against authoritarian states in the Philippines, South Korea, elsewhere in Asia and in Latin America that broke out in the late 1970s, the replacement of Portuguese colonialism in Africa by revolutionary regimes, and the Iranian, Grenadian, and Nicaraguan revolutions in 1979. The intent of this article is not to explain democratic movements in the periphery but to explain the shift in U.S. policy toward "democracy promotion." However, it is useful to distinguish my approach to analyses that focus more narrowly on a correlation between Third World regime change and the world economic downturn that started in the late 1970s and continued to the late 1980s. For instance, in "Regime Change in the Semiperiphery: Democratization in Latin America and the Socialist Bloc" (*Sociological Perspectives* 25/2 (1992): 405–413), Albert Bergesen links democratization movements in the semi-periphery in the 1980s to the general economic downturn experienced in the semi-periphery in that decade. In distinction, I am examining here a broader sweep of time; a more prolonged period of social and political mobilization in the Third World in favor of democratization from the 1950s into the 1980s, which spanned both economic upturns (1960s and first part of 1970s) and downturns (late 1970s and 1980s), and cannot, therefore, be correlated as such with more conjunctural economic swings. Second, Bergesen argues that the periphery remained static in the 1980s while the semi-periphery saw broad regime change. In fact, regime changes in the 1980s did *not* correspond in any neat way to change in the semi-periphery and continuity in the periphery. To the contrary, three of the four cases examined here (Nicaragua, Haiti, the Philippines) are peripheral. Many peripheral countries *did* change regimes (e.g., Paraguay, Bolivia, three other Central American republics, several African countries, etc.), while many key semi-peripheral outposts *did not* experience regime change (e.g., Mexico, the "Asian Tigers," etc.). Third, in a reification of the state, Bergesen assigns historic protagonism to "states" that, driven by some unexplained systemic determinism, "turn inward" to "change their regimes" to "deal with economic hardships," whereas I assign such historic protagonism to social classes and groups that overthrow (or defend) regimes and, in doing so, modify states or create new ones.
18. See Smith, *America's Mission*; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*; William I. Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era* (Boulder: Westview, 1992).
19. W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 167–198.
20. Samuel Huntington, "The Modest Meaning of Democracy," in Robert A. Pastor, *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989); Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
21. A full listing of literature referring to popular democracy is impossible here. As well, this literature is highly heterogeneous. Antonio Gramsci and Rosa Luxembourgh would be the classical thinkers in the Marxist tradition on democracy. For general works discussing theoretical and historical issues of liberal capitalist and Marxist concepts of democracy, see, among others, Alan Hunt, editor, *Marxism and Democracy* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980); David Held, *Political*

- Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Earl L. Shaw (editor), *Modern Competing Ideologies* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973); C. B. MacPherson, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973). For discussion regarding a theory and model of popular democracy, see, among others, Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Carl Cohen, *Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1971); David Held and Christopher Pollitt, editors, *New Forms of Democracy* (London: Sage, 1986); Daniel C. Kramer, *Participatory Democracy: Developing Ideals of the Political Left* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publisher Co., 1972).
22. For detailed discussion on the creation of the NED, see *National Endowment for Democracy (NED): A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Hemispheric Affairs/Albuquerque, The Inter-American Hemispheric Resource Center, 1990); Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, and *A Faustian Bargain*; Holly and Chip Berlet, "NED, CIA, and the Orwellian Democracy Project," *Covert Action* No. 39 (Winter 1991–1992): 10–13, 59–62.
 23. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, editors, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, and the National Endowment for Democracy, 1989), xvi.
 24. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
 25. See, e.g., Stephen R. Gill, *American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gill, editor, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Cox, *PPWO*, and Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium* 12/2 (1983): 162–175; Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London, Pinter Publishers, 1988); Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.
 26. See, e.g., among many world-system works, Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (London: Verso, 1994); and from the Marxist perspective, Harry Magdorff, "Globalization – To What End?" in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, editors, *Socialist Register 1992 New World Order?* (London: The Merlin Press, 1992).
 27. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 238.
 28. My argument here differs sharply from much realist, Marxist, and world-system analysts, who see the decline in U.S. power as reciprocal to a relative increase in the power of other core states. This zero-sum Hobbesian notion of a distribution of power among competing nation states is a hallmark of the state-centered assumption common to much of this type of analysis. The growth of power centers that are transnational, such as the structural power of fully mobile transnational capital over formal state power, and the heightened power of supranational institutions (such as, e.g., the International Monetary Fund) over individual nation states (and whose policies do not correlate to the specific interests of any one state), all suggest that there is no historically-immutable symmetry between a mass of power in the world system and its zero-sum distribution among nation states. To the contrary, effective power (the ability to secure determined outcomes) is increasingly exercised in a global environment through a dense network of supranational institutions and informal relationships (both market and political) that increasingly bypass formal states. This is discussed below, and in more detail in the sources cited in endnote 7.

29. Works on the global economy are voluminous. This section draws, among others, on the following: Joyce Kolko, *Restructuring the World Economy* (New York: Pantheon, 1988); J. Caporaso, editor, *Changing International Division of Labor* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); Steven Hymen, *The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Authur MacEwan and William K. Tabb, *Instability and Change in the World Economy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989); Tamás Szentes, *The Transformation of the World Economy: New Directions and New Interests* (London: Zed Press, 1988); David Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" *New Left Review*, 168, March/April 1988: 24–64.
30. For an analysis of the STR of the immediate post WWII period until the 1960s, followed by a second STR from the 1960s and on, leading to the transnationalization of capital, see Szentes, *The Transformation of the World Economy*.
31. See, in particular, Hymen, *The Multinational Corporation*, for discussion on the spread of capitalist production relations brought with multinational corporations.
32. See, e.g., Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," and PPWO: Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System*.
33. See, e.g., Robert W. Cox, "Global Perestroika," in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, editors, *New World Order? The Socialist Register 1992* (London: The Merlin Press, 1992). For a country case study of this phenomenon, see William I. Robinson, "Nicaragua and the World: A Globalization Perspective," in Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua Without Illusions: Regime Transition and Other Changes in the 1990s* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, forthcoming).
34. Osvaldo Sunkel and Edmundo F. Fuenzalida, "Transnationalization and its National Consequences," in Jose J. Villamil, editor, *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence* (Sussex: Harvester, 1977).
35. Agency for International Development (AID), "The Democratic Initiative" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, December 1990).
36. Department of State, *Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Promise and the Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report no. 158, March 1987), 13.
37. Gill, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations*, 48.
38. See, e.g., the collection of essays in Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, *Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communications in the 1990s* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Co., 1993).
39. Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 13.
40. Ibid., 53–55.
41. Gill and Law, "Global hegemony and the structural power of capital"; Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Review* No. 7, May–June (1977): 6–28; Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
42. See Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System*, chapter 5, "The Culture-ideology of Consumerism in the Third World"; Miguel Korzeniewicz, "Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global Athletic Footwear Industry," in

- Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, editors, *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism* (Westport: Praeger, 1994); William I. Robinson, "A Contribution to the Debate on Globalization: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," *Race and Class*, forthcoming.
43. The issues raised in this section are discussed at considerable length in Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.
 44. Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System*, 2.
 45. A more detailed chronology is to be found in Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, especially chapter two, "Political Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy."
 46. Much has been written on Project Democracy. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Affairs, *The NED*; Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*; Sklar and Berlet, "The NED, the CIA, and the Orwellian Democracy Project."
 47. Ronald Reagan, "Promoting Democracy and Peace," June 8, 1982, speech before the British Parliament, *Current Policy*, No. 399, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C.
 48. See, e.g., Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*; General Accounting Office (GAO) *Promoting Democracy: Foreign Affairs and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities – 1991 to 1993* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994).
 49. See Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*; T. R. Dye, *Who's Running America*, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986).
 50. See Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*.
 51. For further details, see Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, chapters one and two.
 52. See: among the 1980s Project studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, Albert Fishlow, Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Richard R. Fagen, Roger D. Hansen, *Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Richard N. Cooper, Karl Kaiser, Masataka Kosaka, *Toward a Renovated International System*, Triangle Papers 14 (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1977). For discussion, see Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*; Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," *International Organization* 33/2 (Spring 1979): 257–302; G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986); 86 and 112, note 8; Lawrence Schoup, *The Carter Presidency and Beyond* (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1980).
 53. See, e.g., William A. Douglas, *Developing Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Heldref Publications, 1972); Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics*, 1973: 139–154; Claude Ake, *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1979); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1968); Wiarda, *The Democratic Revolution in Latin America*.
 54. Douglas, *Developing Democracy*, 122–123.
 55. Ibid, 16–22.
 56. Doug Bandow, "Economic and Military Aid," in Peter J. Shraeder, editor, *Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 63.
 57. To be sure, "political aid" had been used experimentally, such as in Chile and in Brazil in the 1960s, but did not become a generalized feature of foreign policy toward the Third World as part of a systematic "democracy promotion" policy. To the contrary, much of this scattered political aid was subordinated to projects

- aimed at securing authoritarian outcomes, such as political aid to anti-Allende groups and to Brazilian organizations that later supported the military takeovers.
58. Douglas, *Developing Democracy*, 16.
 59. *Ibid.*, 43.
 60. See, e.g., Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *The NED: A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry*; Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*, and *Promoting Polyarchy*; Sklar and Berlet; "The NED, the CIA, and the Orwellian Democracy Project"; Worth Cooley-Prost, *Democracy Intervention in Haiti: The USAID Democracy Enhancement Project* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Haiti, 1994).
 61. Carl Gershman, "The United States and the World Democratic Revolution," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989).
 62. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).
 63. See Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.
 64. Michael A. Samuels and William A. Douglas, "Promoting Democracy," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1981): 52–53.
 65. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom, *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1987).
 66. Richard J. Kessler, "Marcos and the Americans," *Foreign Policy*, No. 63 (1986): 40–57.
 67. Agency for International Development (AID), "Philippine Assistance Strategy: U.S. Fiscal Years 1991–1995" (Washington, D.C., AID/Department of State, July 1990).
 68. See, e.g., James Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992); Gary Hawes, "Theories of Peasant Revolution: A Critique and Contribution from the Philippines," *World Politics*, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (1990): 261–298.
 69. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator* (New York: Time Books, 1987).
 70. Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*; Stephen W. Bosworth, Speech before the Rotary Club of Makati West, Manila, October 25, 1984, reprinted by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy*, No. 630, Washington, D.C.
 71. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippine Reader*, 324, 325.
 72. AID, "Philippine Assistance Strategy."
 73. See National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Reports, 1984–1991.
 74. AID, "Philippine Assistance Strategy."
 75. NED Annual Reports, 1984–1991.
 76. NED, Annual Report 1986, 14.
 77. See AID, "Philippine Assistance Strategy." Shortly after Aquino's inauguration, the U.S. Congress approved the "Assistance for Democracy Act of 1986," and several supplemental appropriations, involving some \$700 million in economic and military aid for the Philippines for 1986–1987. The aid, and several billion dollars more in multilateral aid, was made conditional upon neo-liberal restructuring. See House of Representatives, "Assistance for Democracy Act of 1986," 99th Congress, 2d Session, Report 99–722, July 30, 1986, Washington, D.C.
 78. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippine Reader*, 309.

79. National Endowment For Democracy, NED internal funding proposal for the 1990 fiscal year, undated, internal document released to the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center through Freedom of Information Act requests and provided to the author for research purposes.
80. National Endowment For Democracy, August 15, 1989 letter from KABATID Chair Dette Pascual to NED Program Officer Marc Plattner, dated August 15, 1989, internal document released to the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center through Freedom of Information Act requests and provided to the author for research purposes.
81. Minutes of the March 17, 1989 Meeting to the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., internal document released to the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center through Freedom of Information Act requests and provided to the author for research purposes.
82. Kim Scipes, "Aquino's Total War and the KMU," *Z Magazine*, January 1990: 116–121; Beth Sims, *Workers of the World Undermined* (Boston: South End Press, 1993).
83. See NED, Annual Reports, 1981–1984.
84. See, for example, NED Annual Report, 1984: 19; NED, "Minutes of the March 1989 Meeting of the Board of Directors, 20; Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI," *The Nation*, February 15, 1986: 170–171; National Endowment for Democracy, December 1988 Proposal from the Free Trade Union Institute to the NED for 1989 Programs, Section B, Asia, internal document released to the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center through Freedom of Information Act requests and provided to the author for research purposes.
85. National Endowment For Democracy, "Request to the National Endowment for Democracy for Funds for the Free Trade Union Institute for FY 1988 Programs," dated December 16, 1987, Section B, Asia, 31–32, internal documents and memoranda released to the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center through Freedom of Information Act requests and provided to the author for research purposes.
86. For an excellent analysis of overall post-Marcos developments in the Philippines, see Walden Bello and John Gershman, "Democratization and Stabilization in the Philippines," *Critical Sociology* 17/1 (1990): 35–56. See also Benedict Anderson's illuminating account of how the traditional ruling class managed to retain its power through the transition, in "Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," *New Left Review* No. 169 (May/June 1988): 3–31.
87. Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, editors, *From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, and Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 5.
88. See, e.g., Cesar N. Caviedes, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Rebuilding Political Consensus in Chile* (Washington, D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center/Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982–1990* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).
89. Martha Lyn Doggett, "Washington's Not So Quiet Diplomacy," *NACLA Report on the Americas*. Vol. 22, No. 2. March–April 1988: 29–38.
90. Peter Winn, "U.S. Electoral Aid in Chile: Reflections on a Success Story," paper presented at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) conference, "U.S. Electoral Assistance and Democratic Development." Washington, D.C., January 19, 1990.

91. See Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*, 23.
92. Thomas W. Walker (editor), *Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua* (Boulder: Westview, 1987).
93. Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain*; "Nicaragua and the World: A Globalization Perspective; Angel Saldomando, *El Retorno de la AID, Caso de Nicaragua: Condicionalidad y Reestructuración Conservadora* (Managua: Ediciones CRIES, 1992).
94. On Haiti's insertion into the global economy and the proletarianization of the peasantry, see, e.g.: Mats Lundahl, *Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York: Monthly Review, 1990); Tom Barry, Beth Woods, and Deb Preusch, *The Other Side of Paradise: Foreign Control in the Caribbean* (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 330–341.
95. See, for example, Worth Cooley-Prost, *Democracy Intervention in Haiti*; Paul Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1994); James Ridgeway, (editor), *The Haiti Files: Decoding The Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Azul Editions, 1994).
96. See William I. Robinson, "Haiti: Behind the Occupation is Washington's Elusive Goal of Stabilizing Elite Rule," *Notisur*, Vol. 4, No. 37, October 7, 1994, Latin America Data Base, Latin America Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
97. See NED Annual Reports, 1984–1992.
98. See, e.g., NED Annual Report, 1992, 9.
99. See, e.g., the entire special issue of the NED's quarterly publication, *Journal of Democracy* (Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1993) dedicated to this subject.
100. World system and much international relations theory posit an international system whose fundamental character is the division into nation-states. Change can occur, such as in trends and cycles analyzed in world system theory, but the construct itself is predicated on the continuation of state systems. A conception of historic change should not be circumscribed by a state-centered perspective that posits an immutable state system as an immanent systemic feature. I share with the Italian school and related lines of research into globalization a view that globalization involves a modification of the nation-state system, including the notion that a decline in the relative power of individual nations under transnationalization is bound up with new forms of transnational power rather than a transfer of relative quotas of power from one nation-state to another. This theme is best left for further research. Suffice it here to cite Ruggie's strongly worded but well-founded observation: "There is an extraordinary impoverished mind-set at work here, one that is able to visualize long-term challenges to the system of states only in terms of entities that are institutionally substitutable for the state ... as opposed to exploring the possibility of fundamental institutional discontinuity in the system of states" ("Territoriality and beyond," 143).
101. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1966); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huper Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992).
102. Although tangential to the discussion, it is worth noting that the displacement of pre-capitalist production relations in peripheral regions implies the predominance of wage labor globally, which does not involve extra-economic compulsion.

This is clearly related to the spread of polyarchy, and suggests that Wallerstein's model of predominantly non-coerced labor in the center and coerced labor in the periphery does not hold up to empirical scrutiny under the changes involved in globalization.

103. See, e.g., Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions." *Theory and Society* 22 (1994): 209–247; Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Moshiri Farrokh, editors, *Revolutions in the Late 20th Century* (Boulder: Westview, 1991); John Foran, "A Theory of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador Compared" *Critical Sociology* 19 (1992): 3– 27; Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
104. See, e.g., Edward A. Muller, "Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence," *American Sociological Review* 50 (1985): 47–61; "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review* 53 (1988): 50–68.